INCOMING TELEGRAM

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Action	NP-	•			Control: Rec'd:	1328 JUNE 2, 1961 —
Info	FROM	: BELGRADE				11:58 AM
SB EUR	TO:	Secretary of	State		****	
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	F	PARIS PERSONAL	FOR SECR	ETARY.		<u>o</u>
	C	DEPTEL 830, REF	EATED PA	RIS 5140.		•
	[[[]	MUCH APPRECIATE CONNECTION WITH CAN SAY THAT N BACKGROUND CONS AT THIS TIME AND INDERLYING EXPEN	VIENNA WOULD BE IDERATIO D AM NOT	MEETING BUT HELPFUL. NS THAT LED ENTIRELY C	FEAR TH AM NOT I TO ARRA ERTAIN A	NERE IS LITTLE NFORMED AS TO NGEMENT OF MEETING NO NS TO
•	NTIHALPP.W	O RESIST ANY ON NOTO PLAY OUR OF E IS WELL ACQUAND KNOWS THAT WE CHALLENGED IN ROPOSE TO OFFER	SONALLY //ERT ENC! SELIGATION (INTED WILL N E WILL N I THIS M/ I US SUCH H AS WOULES. WHA	ASSURED AT ROACHMENT TO UNDER UN OF THE STATE ANNER. HE EN CHALLENGES ULD THREATEN ATEVER PRESS	THIS TIM HAT WOULD OR EXIST JATION II TO READ DOES NOT IN TO EMBI	D BRING ING ALLIANCES. N THESE RESPECTS CT WITH DETERMINATION , I AM SURE, CAN HELP IT, ROIL US DIRECTLY MAY BE
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THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE ONES WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, WOULD PRESENT US WITH AN OVERT AND CLEAR CHALLENGE OF THIS NATURE.

IT WOULD NOT BE USEFUL FOR ME TO ATTEMPT TO ENTER AT THIS DATE INTO DISCUSSION OF OUR POSITIONS ON THOSE GREAT QUESTIONS, SUCH AS GERMANY, BERLIN, KOREA-JAPAN, ET CETERA, IN WHICH RUSSIAN INTERESTS AND OUR OWN ARE BOTH NORMALLY INVOLVED, WHICH CONSTITUTE IN MY VIEW CENTER AND SOURCE OF DEEPEST TENSIONS. ON OTHER HAND, I AM SKEPTICAL OF USEFULNESS OF ANY DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH KHRUSHCHEV OF PERIPHERAL SITUATIONS SUCH AS LAOS, CUBA, AND IRAN. SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY AS A RULE IS NOT FORMALLY INVOLVED IN THESE SITUATIONS; AND WHERE SOVIET POLICIES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THEIR EXACERBATION, THESE HAVE BEEN ONLY ONE OF MANY FACTORS.

IT SEEMS TO ME EVIDENT THAT DECISIONS OF EIGHTY ONE PARTIES MEETING IN MOSCOW LAST FALL RESTED ON AGREED CALCULATION, AS BETWEEN RUSSIANS AND CHINESE, THAT AMERICA'S WORLD POSITION AND INFLUENCE COULD PROBABLY BE EFFECTIVELY SHATTERED IN COMING PERIOD, AND THE NATO GROUP POLITICALLY ISOLATED, BY SERIES OF SHARP INDIRECT POLITICAL PRESSURES, RUTHLESS EXPLOITATION OF COLONIAL ISSUE, AND ALL-OUT PROPAGANDA ATTACK. I THINK IT COULD USEFULLY BE EMPHASIZED TO KHRUSHCHEV THAT A POLITICAL PROGRAM FOUNDED ON SUCH CALCULATION IS NOT ONLY WHOLLY INCONSISTENT WITH ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE BUT COULD SCARCELY BE EXPECTED TO ACHIEVE COMPLETION WITHOUT AT SOME POINT CREATING SITUATIONS WHERE OUR MILITARY OBLIGATIONS WOULD BECOME INVOLVED AND COMPLICATIONS CREATED BEYOND ANYONE'S CONTROL. IT COULD BE JUSTLY PUT TO KHRUSHCHEV THAT INFLAMMATORY AND INSULTING LANGUAGE IN WHICH RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN CAST CONSTITUTES ALONE A GRIEVOUS DISSERVICE TO ANY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE WORLD SITUATION AND PLAYS DIRECTLY INTO HANDS OF THOSE WHO VIEWWITH DISFAVOR OR DESPAIR THE PROSPECT OF ANY IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS.

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Rec'd:

Control: 1347

JUNE 2, 1961 12:08 PM

info 515

FROM: BELGRADE

TO:

Secretary of State

SB EUR

NO: 981, JUNE 2, 3 PM (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

RMR

NIACT

SENT DEPARTMENT 981. PARIS 66.

WASHINGTON PERSONAL FOR ACTING SECRETARY.

PARIS PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY.

IN LIGHT OF ABOVE, IT SEEMS TO ME GENERAL TENOR OF PRESIDENT'S APPROACH COULD WELL BE THAT (1) BASIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS DIVIDING US FROM RUSSIANS AND CHINESE IN EUROPEAN AND EAST-ASIAN AREAS, OUTSIDE OF DISARMAMENT, ARE OF SUCH DIFFICULTY THAT MUCH TIME AND PATIENT PREPARATION OF PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE INVOLVED BEFORE ANY PRACTICAL NEGOTIATING APPROACH COULD BE MADE TO THEIR SOLUTIONS; (2) WE WOULD LIKE TO START ON THE LONG TASK OF CULTIVATING A SUITABLE ATMOSPHERE AND CLIMATE OF OPINION IN WHICH TO TACKLE THESE QUESTIONS; BUT (3) IT IS IDLE TO ATTEMPT THIS IN FACE OF THE IMPRESSIONS RECENTLY CREATED BY VICLENT RUSSIAN STATEMENTS, BY OBVIOUS ATTEMPT TO DESTROY UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT, AND BY EQUALLY OBVIOUS EFFORT TO EXPLOIT COLONIAL AND OTHER ISSUES WITH A VIEW TO BLACKENING AMERICAN IMAGE BEFORE WORLD PUBLIC, DISTORTING AMERICAN ACTION AND INTENTIONS, AND SOWING HATRED AND MISTRUST OF AMERICAN PEOPLE.

THOUGH AWARE THAT MY VIEWS IN THIS RESPECT ARE AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE OF MANY PROMINENT AMERICAN STUDENTS OF SOVIET SCENE WITHIN AND WITHOUT GOVERNMENT, I HAVE STILL NOT SEEN EVIDENCE TO CONVINCE ME THAT KHRUSHCHEV IS AN

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ABSOLUTE DICTATOR OF POLICY WITHIN THE COMMUNIST ORBIT OR THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT VIEWS OF OTHER PEOPLE AND PARTIES. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT HINTS TRANSMITTED TO US FROM TIME TO TIME ALONG THIS LINE (MOST RECENTLY TO ME PERSONALLY BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE, YESTERDAY) ARE WHOLLY WITHOUT SUBSTANCE. I THINK KHRUSHCHEV HAS, FOR VARIOUS REASONS, A GREATER INTEREST IN RELAXATION OF TENSIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST THAN HAVE HIS CHINESE ALLIES; THAT IT WAS NOT WITHOUT INNER HESITATIONS AND CONFLICTS THAT HE WAS LED LAST FALL TO ACCEPT THE AGGRESSIVE CHINESE LINE ON SPREADING OF SOCIALISM BY MEANS SHORT OF ALL-OUT WAR; AND THAT HE COULD WELL USE SOME HELP FROM OUTSIDE IN ARGUING FOR A SOMEWHAT MORE MODERATE AND PRUDENT COURSE ON PART OF COMMUNIST PARTIES. FOR THIS REASON, I HOPE HIS PERSONAL POSITION, AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF VIENNA TALKS ON IT, WILL NOT BE LEFT OUT OF OUR CONSIDERATION AS WE PLAN OUR APPROACH TO THE MEETING.

FROM THE PARTICULAR VANTAGE POINT OF BELGRADE, IT IS EVIDENT THAT NONCOMMITTED WORLD NOW STAND AT VERY CRUCIAL PARTING OF THE WAYS. IF SOME RELAXATION OF OVER-ALL WORLD TENSIONS IS NOT ACHIEVED, IT SEEMS TO ME VERY LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE SERIOUS SPLIT BETWEEN THAT GROUP OF UNALIGNED NATIONS WHICH IS VIOLENTLY ANTI-WESTERN AND ANTI-AMERICAN AND THAT WHICH WOULD LIKE TO PRESERVE DECENT RELATIONS WITH THE WEST. THIS ISSUE MAY BE AT STAKE IN FORTHCOMING CAIRO MEETING. TO EXTENT THAT VIENNA MEETING CREATES IMPRESSION OF IMPROVEMENT OF SOVIET-WESTERN RELATIONS, YUGOSLAVIA, WHOSE INFLUENCE TOGETHER WITH THAT OF NEHRU MAY BE DECISIVE IN DETERMINING TRENDS WITHIN THE NONALIGNED GROUP, WILL BE CAUTIONED AGAINST ASSOCIATION WITH ANTI-WESTERN TENDENCIES. IF, HOWEVER, NO IMPROVEMENT IN

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS ACHIEVED AT THIS TIME, POSITION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND OTHER NEUTRALS MAY BE EXPECTED TO BECOME MORE DIFFICULT; AND IN THIS CASE, AS THINGS NOW STAND, THERE WOULD BE SMALL HOPE OF DRAWING THIS COUNTRY GENERALLY TO THE PRO-WESTERN CAMP.

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